The War Against Iraq – Part II

by Kevin

The strongest argument against this case for action is the risks involved: instability; the high cost in men, material, etc.; and the lack of a clear endgame; for example. There is a strong case that a war with Iraq is unlikely to result in a stable and friendly regime unless we impose it with a vast nation-building scheme whose cost and implications negate the potential value. First let’s review a few issues that have been asserted as reasons why the war would back fire:

- Lack of international support: I think this is a rather weak argument. I think the UN, for example, is exactly the wrong tool for this operation. UN operations – like the last war – require a great deal of alliance building and action based on consensus. Since we would being going to war primarily for our own unilateral national interest, UN involvement would hamper rather than help. I think it is very likely that we will have no problem developing the operational support that we need (I think the UK, France, and even Russia will likely offer support – grudging support in the case of Russia). It is true, however, that international support is a useful tool; it served Bush pere well in the previous engagement. But in this case we could build a smaller but more cohesive coalition and brave the early criticism; eventually power attracts support.

- War means big government. Again, this is a perfectly rational fear, and a well founded one historically, but it is a weak argument in this case. The relative size of government is not going to change a great deal just because we invade Iraq. This will not be a massive countrywide mobilization for a world war. The fight against terrorism is likely to strengthen big government regardless of exactly how we deal with Iraq. I wish we lived in a time of peace so we could debate the benefits of small, localized government but that is not the environment we are in, so we must deal with what we are given.

- The caveat to the above might be any scenario that involves a massive long-term attempt to build Iraq into some sort of ideal liberal democracy. I am not making the argument that invading Iraq and defeating Saddam should be followed by an America occupation and reconstruction of Iraq along the lines of Japan but I realize that some do seem to be making just that argument. This type of utopian scheme worries me but the moderate position is still the focus: that we defeat Iraq and seek peace with any stable and independent government that can be constructed; not seek a idealized western democracy built by American soldiers.

- We must deal with the Israeli Palestinian problem first: I think this is a tenuous assertion. Just as I don’t see any immediate resolution of the conflict flowing out of the overthrow of Saddam, I don’t see a resolution of the current violence in Israel as a direct benefit to our dealings with Iraq. But if I had to lean towards one or the other, I think defeating Iraq first is likely strengthen our position in the region rather than vice versa. I don’t see the US constructing a peace settlement in Israel any time soon anyways, so this is really just an excuse not to act.

Give the weakness of the above; I think the strongest argument against war with Iraq is that such an action will entangle us in a mess in Iraq with little hope for resolution. The argument asserts: it would be unwise to go to war with Iraq because what we are likely to get is more danger and less stability than what we have currently. What is necessary is not war but strategic diplomacy: figure out what will motivate Saddam to put his gun down. Currently, we have offered Saddam neither carrot nor stick. Instead we have placed him in a damned if you do damned if you don’t position – the type of position most likely to destabilize and inflame the region – leading to violence and destruction that could have been avoided.

Underlying this point is the relative risks involved. If you feel that Saddam is dangerously close to having WMD than I think the logical choice is to err on the side of action. If you think that gun pointed at your back is loaded and held by an itchy trigger finger then you best act to avoid being shot. If on the other hand, you believe that Saddam is currently unable to develop these weapons without anyone knowing or that we have time, then action become less necessary.

As you can see these two arguments are the flip sides of each other. The crucial element is one of restrained expectations for the post-war situation. This is why I am moderately more supportive of war with Iraq then I am of continuing containment but only if the goal is simply to defeat Iraq, topple Saddam, and allow the people of Iraq to construct a government. If the goal is nation building and step one in an ongoing regime change for the entire region then I move towards the containment camp. Based on the limited information I have, I think the risk Saddam poses is significant enough and that our position is weakening enough that decisive action to destroy Saddam is worth the risk of mission creep and the dangers of ever escalating cost (both human and material). I have a hard time envisioning things getting better over time without decisive and strong action. The tools of international diplomacy seem ill suited to changing the environment. They are better utilized to maintain the status quo. After much thought and analysis I believe the status quo is simply not good enough.