Conservatism, Labels, and American Foreign Policy

Continuing my “better late than never” theme, I want to tackle some articles from last year. These articles relate to conservatism and American Foreign Policy. At their heart they are about the use of labels and the battle of ideas within and without the conservative movement. A quick look at the articles will, I hope, shed some light on American Conservatism and US foreign policy.

First off let me admit a bias. I am coming at this issue from the study of history not political science or philosophy. Obviously I have some knowledge, and even some academic experience, in both but my main background has always been history – hence American foreign policy not international relations. I have studied US diplomacy and foreign policy throughout my undergrad and graduate education. My thesis was an intellectual history of the containment debate during the cold war. What follows is just my own limited take on a complicated and difficult issue so take it with a grain of salt.

The issue at the heart of these articles is what is a conservative foreign policy or really what is a proper foreign policy for America. In attempting to explain and define this goal the authors discuss labels like realist or idealist and conservative, neo-conservative, and paleo-conservative. While all of these labels have their flaws to claim that they are without meaning is hyperbolic. The problem is when you seek precision and uniformity in these labels rather than generalities and indicators. In general all of these terms play out along a spectrum. We could all lay out different figures along a line from paleo-conservative to conservative to neo-conservative (we could even go beyond to neo-liberal, liberal, etc.) without too much confusion or warping of positions. We could do the same thing on a realist-idealist line. In order to avoid confusion, however, there is one other dynamic that needs addressing. There are a variety of ways in which the terms “conservative” is used. For my purposes we can describe them as political, philosophical, and practical conservatives. The political conservative is a politician whose policies and votes are in the mainstream of the Republican Party. This conservative for the most part prefers the market to the state, traditional values and social structures to radical innovations and lifestyle choices, and supports a vigorous defense of American national interests. The philosophical conservative is less focused on direct political action than on first principles. He stresses the existence of objective standards in morality and aesthetics. The philosophical conservative at hearts is concerned with ordered freedom. He is concerned with the good society; with virtue and character. The practical conservative is simply a person who stresses prudence. He values the small over the large, variety over unanimity, and the close and real over the far away and abstract. This person does not necessarily base all of his personal or political decisions on an overarching worldview but rather simply seeks to avoid extremes.

Now obviously a single individual can be all three of these things at once or degrees of each one as events and ideas warrant. I just wanted to sketch the outline of some perspectives that influence what type of conservative one might be. For example, a politician, an academic, and a policeman might all be “conservative” but in different ways. But let’s go ahead and dive into the articles.

The first article I want to look at is Francis Fukuyama’s Wall Street Journal piece on a conservative foreign policy for today. Fukuyama’s piece can be divided into three parts. The first part tries to get a handle on what conservatism means in America. The second part looks at realism and idealism in conservatism and American foreign policy. The last part tries to apply conservative cautions to potential foreign policy actions. I think the first part is by far the weakest part.

Basically, Fukuyama tries to paint all conservative with the “classical liberal” brush:

There are almost no European-style conservatives in the United States, people who want to defend a status quo based on hierarchy, tradition and a pessimistic view of human nature. Those we label “conservatives” in this country are called “liberals” in Europe, because they are in favor of free markets, individual initiative and a democratic polity based on individual, not collective, rights . . . If one definition of a conservative is a defender of the status quo, then it is safe to say that American conservatives (a k a classical liberals) have never been this type of creature. This is true both in economics and in politics. Free-market competition is, in Schumpeter’s words, a process of “creative destruction.” Market competition means the relentless promotion of technological innovation and entrepreneurship, which brings in its train turmoil and social change. Globalization is intensely threatening to vested interests because it destroys jobs and livelihoods even as it creates new wealth and opportunity. Those who want to slow down or reverse globalization in the name of protecting the environment or defending the rights of workers are in fact taking a conservative position of opposing potentially progressive change–even though we think of antiglobalization activists as being on the left. The political agenda of American conservatives is no less revolutionary. From the beginning, Americans regarded their values and institutions as embodying universal aspirations that would one day have a significance far beyond the shores of the United States. The Great Seal on the back of the dollar bill bears the inscription novus ordo seclorum–”new order of the ages”–that expresses a very unconservative sentiment with potentially revolutionary consequences. In this view, democracy, constitutional government and the individual rights on which they rest are good not just for North Americans by virtue of their peculiar habits and traditions, but for all people around the world. Hence the United States in its foreign policy has been anything but a status quo power.

This definition is both unhelpful and disingenuous. One of the reasons for this is the fact that Fukuyama never locates his terms. Does he mean conservative throughout the history of America? Does he mean modern American conservatives? In fact the terms he uses apply to the vast majority of people in this country. One of the reasons America is different than Europe is that we agree on so much. The large political center in America has always been in favor of the free market, individual rights, and democracy. In fact most of the arguments center on just how free market, how individual, how democratic we should be with the radical pushing both extremes and the rest of us fighting in the middle. The same is true of Fukuyama’s stress on universalism. Most Americans believe in objective and universal values but struggle with how best to foster them. Fukuyama’s discussion of “conservatism” is a dead end. What he is really describing is the “vital center” if you will; the middle ground of American politics. When he discusses conservatism he is much closer to the practical type described above than a true political or philosophical conservative as we would understand them today.

Fukuyama’s vague definition of conservatism is not fatal to his point, however, as he does a much better job when he moves directly to foreign policy:

Here, conservatism has frequently been identified with what international relations specialists label “realism,” that is, the view that world politics is a remorseless struggle for power on the part of sovereign nation-states that must ultimately look to themselves for their security. Its opposite, liberal internationalism, sees the possibility of global order emerging based on shared norms and values, implemented through an increasingly dense system of international laws and organizations. Realists focus on the balance of power and military preparedness; liberal internationalists on institutions, rules and legal constraints.

Now here we are on to something. Realists concentrate on power and preparedness idealists on organizations, agreements, and communication. Fukuyama also understands that few Americans are comfortable in a hard and fast position on this spectrum:

American foreign policy has always been pulled in two directions, toward a realist defense of national security defined in relatively narrow terms, and toward an expansive sense of American purposes that rests directly on the exceptionalism of American institutions and the messianic belief in their universal applicability.

This is certainly true. As I have stated before, Americans have traditionally rejected outright imperialism and frowned upon international do-goodism but they have also traditionally rallied behind idealistic rhetoric and projects. We can be hard hearted but we also like to believe we are doing not just the prudent thing but also the right thing. This is the heart of Fukuyama’s article not his feint toward American conservatism. The question is can these two ideas or strains be reconciled? Can they work together? Is conservatism tied to realism? Or does the realism versus idealism debate take place outside conservatism versus liberalism?

Well this thing has gotten rather long so I will wrap this up for today. Tomorrow I hope to discuss these questions and tie them to debates over neo-cons and paleo-cons. So check back then . . .